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First Guaranty Bank v. Baton Rouge Petroleum Center:'
The Louisiana Supreme Court Re-Examines Executory
Process and Deficiency Judgment
A creditor enforced its mortgage on debtor's property through ex-
ecutory process. After proper appraisal, the mortgaged property was
sold at a judicial sale for the required minimum price of two-thirds of
the appraised value. 2 The creditor then brought an action for a deficiency
judgment to recover the balance of the debt.
The debtor opposed the deficiency judgment on the grounds that
the creditor had not attached an authentic copy of the corporate res-
olution that authorized execution of the mortgage.3 Authentic evidence
of such a resolution is an essential link of proof for executory process
against property mortgaged by a corporation.
On original hearing, the supreme court followed a long line of cases
that began with League Central Credit Union v. Montgomery4 and held
that a creditor who causes property to be sold by executory process
without submitting the proper authentic evidence may not obtain a
deficiency judgment in a subsequent action against the mortgagor cor-
poration.5 On rehearing, the creditor argued that League Central, upon
which the court's original opinion relied, was an "unwarranted departure
from the Code of Civil Procedure and statutes." ' 6 Persuaded by the
creditor's argument, the supreme court unanimously overruled League
Central, reasoning that the defense to a deficiency judgment action
created by that case had no statutory basis. Accordingly, the court found
that the creditor was entitled to a deficiency judgment against the debtor. 7
Copyright 1989, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. 529 So. 2d 834 (La. 1988).
2. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 2336.
3. The resolution had been passed and filed in the public records when the mortgage
was executed. The agent named in the resolution had authority to execute the mortgage
in question. However, Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 2635 requires that
authentic evidence of this resolution be submitted with the plaintiff's petition for executory
process. See infra text accompanying note 14.
4. 251 La. 971, 207 So. 2d 762 (1968).
5. The original opinion was written by Justice Cole. Justice Dennis concurred and
Chief Justice Dixon and Justices Lemmon and Marcus dissented.
6. First Guar. Bank v. Baton Rouge Petroleum Center, Inc., 529 So. 2d 834, 838
(La. 1988).
7. The court awarded $264,620, the amount of the note sued on, less $190,915.78,
the proceeds of the judicial sale, plus attorney's fees, interest and costs. On Sept. 9, 1988
the supreme court issued a per curium opinion which amended the decree of May 23 so
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First Guaranty Bank v. Baton Rouge Petroleum Center, Inc. is an
important decision because it rejected the rationale of League Central
and abolished the affirmative defense to deficiency judgment created by
that case. Under League Central, debtors could allow their mortgaged
property to be sold under a defective executory process and then assert
the defect in that proceeding to defeat a subsequent action against them
for deficiency judgment. Debtors were thus able to limit their creditor's
recovery to the proceeds of the judicial sale of the mortgaged property,
which was often substantially less than the amount of the principal
debt. First Guaranty prevents debtors from employing this strategy to
deny their creditors full recovery.
This note will examine the changes in the law that result from the
court's decision in First Guaranty. The legal background of this decision
will be presented in a discussion of the relevant statutory law and prior
jurisprudence. Then there will be an examination of the First Guaranty
opinion, followed by an analysis of the decision's effects upon executory
process and parties involved in executory proceedings. Finally, there will
be an evaluation of the First Guaranty decision and its implications and
a recommendation designed to minimize the harshness inherent in ex-
ecutory proceedings.
STATUTORY BACKGROUND
The court in First Guaranty based its decision on a finding that
League Central was not in accord with Louisiana's positive law regarding
executory process and deficiency judgment. A complete review of the
law encompassing executory process and deficiency judgment is beyond
the scope of this note, but the court's decision is best read with the
relevant statutory background in mind.
Executory process is an in rem action' that provides a simple,
expeditious, and inexpensive9 ex parte procedure by which creditors may
initiate "the seizure and sale of property, without previous citation and
as to delete attorney's fees from the award:
A limited rehearing is granted. In order to avoid the possibility of judicial
approval of an excessive attorney's fee, and to permit a court to consider all
of the relevant circumstances, the provision relating to attorney's fees is deleted
from our decree, and the case is remanded to the trial court which is directed
to fix the attorney's fee. Otherwise, the decree of this court is reaffirmed.
529 So. 2d at 845.
8. McMahon, The Historical Development of Executory Procedure in Louisiana, 32
Tul. L. Rev. 555, 560 (1958).
9. Id. at 571-72.
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judgment, to enforce a mortgage or privilege thereon evidenced by an
authentic act importing a confession of judgment."' 0
The creditor begins the proceeding by filing a petition praying for
seizure and sale of the property encumbered by the mortgage." The
creditor must attach to his petition certain types of evidence that prove
the right to use executory process. The evidence required to be in
authentic form includes:
- The note, bond, or other instrument evidencing the obligation
secured by the mortgage or privilege.
- The authentic act of mortgage or privilege importing a con-
fession of judgment.
- If the secured property is movable, the act of mortgage or
privilege importing a confession of judgment, whether by au-
thentic act or by private signature duly acknowledged.
- Any judgment, judicial letters, order of court, or authentic
act necessary to complete the proof of plaintiff's right to use
executory process. ' 2
When the creditor seeks to enforce a mortgage on movable property
through executory process, the creditor may prove the mortgage by an
act of mortgage under private signature duly acknowledged. 3 In addition,
certain documents are deemed authentic for purposes of executory proc-
ess.' 4 These include the note evidencing the obligation when it is paraphed
for identification with the mortgage, certified copies of judgments or
authentic acts, certified copies of partnership contracts that authorizes
a mortgage, and copies of corporate resolutions authorizing a mortgage.'5
Other evidence need not be authentic but may be proved by a verified
petition, supplemental petition, or affidavit. 6
10. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2631. This article provides: "Executory proceedings are
those which are used to effect the seizure and sale of property, without previous citation
and judgment, to enforce a mortgage or privilege thereon evidenced by an authentic act
importing a confession of judgment, and in other cases allowed by law."
Code of Civil Procedure article 2632 defines an "act importing a confession of judgment"
as an act in which "the obligor therein acknowledges the obligation secured thereby,
whether then existing or to arise thereafter, and confesses judgment thereon if the obligation
is not paid at maturity."
11. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2634.
12. Id. art. 2635.
13. Id.
14. Id. art. 2636.
15. Id. Hence, if the creditor in First Guaranty had attached a corporate resolution
that was not in authentic form, the proceeding would not have been defective, for the
resolution would be deemed to be in authentic form under article 2636.
16. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 2637, specifying the evidence which need not be
authentic although it is often essential in confirming the creditor's right to use executory
process.
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Upon finding that the plaintiff has submitted the required evidence,
the court 7 will order the issuance of a writ commanding the sheriff to
seize and sell the mortgaged property."m Before this writ is executed,
however, the sheriff must serve the debtor with a demand for payment, 9
which notifies the debtor that if payment is not made within three days,
the writ of seizure and sale will be executed on the mortgaged property. 20
If payment is not made within three days, the sheriff will seize the
mortgaged property and serve the debtor with a written notice of that
seizure. 2' The sheriff must then advertise the impending judicial sale of
the property, 22 at least once for movable property and at least twice
for immovable property in the manner provided by law.23
The Code of Civil Procedure requires that prior to judicial sale the
seized property be appraised in accordance with law. 24 The sheriff will
not sell the property at the initial judicial sale if the price offered by
the highest bidder is, less than two-thirds the appraised value of the
property. 25 At the second sale, however, the property may be sold for
whatever price it will bring. 26 If the debtor has waived appraisal in the
act of mortgage, the creditor may direct that the property be sold without
appraisal. 27 The sale without appraisal will proceed more quickly and
less expensively. The creditor, however, does forfeit rights by selling
without appraisal. The Deficiency Judgment Act 28 provides that where
17. Under La. Code Civ. P. art. 283, clerks of court have the power to order seizure
and sale under executory process; however, these orders are customarily issued upon order
of the court.
18. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2638.
19. Id. art. 2639.
20. The right to receive a demand for payment before issuance of the writ of seizure
and sale may be waived by the debtor in the act or mortgage or privilege. See La. Code
Civ. P. art. 2639. Since the right usually is waived, it is of little practical consequence.
21. Id. art. 2721.
22. Id. art. 2722 provides: "After seizure of the property, the sheriff shall proceed
to advertise the sale of the property, in accordance with the provisions of the first
paragraph of Article 2331."
23. Id. art. 2331. For further insight into "the manner [of advertisement] provided
by law" see La. R. S. 43:200 through 211 (1982 & Supp. 1989).
24. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2723. The statutory guidelines for appraisal incident to a
judicial sale are set forth in La. R.S. 13:4363 through 4366 (1968 & Supp. 1989).
25. This requirement is found in La. Code Civ. P. art. 2336 dealing with judicial
sale under writ of fieri facias. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2724 enumerates the provisions
relating to a sale of property under a writ of fieri facias that shall also be applied to a
sale of property under a writ of seizure and sale.
26. La. Code Civ. P. arts. 2336, 2724.
27. Id. art. 2723.
28. La. R.S. 13:4106-4108.2 (1968 & Supp. 1989). Section 4106 provides:
If a mortgagee or other creditor takes advantage of a waiver of appraisement
of his property, movable, immovable, or both, by a debtor, and the proceeds
NOTES
a creditor causes the debtor's property to be sold without appraisal, the
debt will be considered fully satisfied and deficiency judgment will be
unavailable.
29
The debtor may prevent the sale in one of several ways. Most
obviously, the debtor can simply pay the debt, interest, and costs to
the sheriff before adjudication. The debtor may also use an injunction
to arrest the seizure and sale.31 The seizure and sale may be arrested
by injunction when the debt secured by the mortgage has been extin-
guished, is legally unenforceable, or, more importantly for purposes of
this paper, when the proper procedure has not been followed in the
executory process. If an injunction is granted, the court may allow the
debtor damages for wrongful seizure, including attorneys' fees.12 Finally,
of the judicial sale thereof are insufficient to satisfy the debt for which the
property was sold, the debt nevertheless shall stand fully satisfied and discharged
insofar as it constitutes a personal obligation of the debtor. The mortgagee or
other creditor shall not have a right thereafter to proceed against the debtor
or any of his other property for such deficiency, except as provided in the next
paragraph.
If a mortgage or pledge affects two or more properties, movable, immovable,
or both, the judicial sale of any property so affected without appraisement shall
not prevent the enforcement of the mortgage or pledge in rem against any other
property affected thereby.
La. R.S. 13:4107 (1968) provides: "R.S. 13:4106 declares a public policy and
the provisions thereof cannot, and shall not be waived by the debtor, but it
shall only apply to mortgages, contracts, debts or other obligations made, or
arising on or after August 1, 1934."
29. Hence, unless the creditor has requested a sale with appraisal, the First Guaranty
issue does not arise, for the express terms of the Deficiency Judgment Act preclude the
creditor from collecting additional sums from the debtor. Only when some other sort of
defect appears-in First Guaranty the defect was failure to prove corporate authority by
auhentic evidence-does the First Guaranty opinion become important.
30. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2340. This article applies to judicial sales under writ of
seizure and sale, see supra note 25.
The law also affords certain protections to the debtor who cannot meet the demand
for payment. The United States Supreme Court has found that due process requires that
debtors be afforded certain procedural protection when faced with collection actions such
as executory process. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S. Ct. 1983 (1972). Louisiana's
executory process has been found to provide the debtor with constitutionally sufficient
procedural protection in light of Fuentes. Ross v. Brown Title Corp., 356 F. Supp. 595,
aff'd 412 U.S. 934, 93 S. Ct. 2788 (1973). For a discussion of constitutional issues involved
in executory process, see Comment, Executory and Special Proceedings: Executory Process,
Attachment and Sequestration, 22 Loy. L. Rev. 190, 205-09 (1976); Comment, Fuentes
v. Shevin: Its Treatment by Louisiana Courts and Effect upon Louisiana Law, 47 Tul.
L. Rev. 807, 818-27 (1973).
31. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2642.
32. Id. art. 2751 provides:
In the event injunctive relief is granted to the defendant, if the court finds the
seizure in the executory proceeding to be wrongful, it may allow damages to
the defendant. Attorney's fees for the services rendered in connection with the
injunction may be included as an element of the damages.
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the debtor may halt the sale by taking a suspensive appeal from the
judicial order of sale. 3 The debtor must appeal the order within fifteen
days of its signing. 4 The debtor must also furnish security for the appeal
in "an amount exceeding by one-half the balance due on the debt
secured by the mortgage or privilege sought to be enforced, including
principal, interest to date of the order of appeal, and attorney's fees,
but exclusive of court costs." 35
The victory obtained by a debtor who has the sale enjoined or
successfully takes a suspensive appeal will likely be short lived. Neither
an injunction of a sale based on defective proceedings or the appeal of
that defective proceeding will prevent collection of the debt, and will
not prevent a later sale made through proper proceedings. In fact, the
creditor whose sale has been halted because of defective proceedings
may simply convert the executory process into an ordinary proceeding
by amending his petition and enforce the mortgage by ordinary process,
a slower and more cumbersome method.3 6
If a balance remains on the debt after the distribution of the proceeds
of the judicial sale with appraisal, the creditor may seek a personal
judgment against the debtor for the deficiency. 7 The creditor may obtain
this deficiency judgment either by converting the executory process into
an ordinary proceeding after the sale or by bringing a new suit against
the debtor by ordinary process. The deficiency judgment action, unlike
executory process, requires both citation of the debtor and in personam
jurisdiction over him. 38 The creditor may not rely on a confession of
judgment39 but instead must plead and prove both the obligation creating
the debt4 and the debtor's nonperformance.4 ' The creditor must also
33. Id. art. 2642.
34. Id.
35. Id. Because it requires a bond exceeding by more than one-half the total mortgage
indebtedness, a security that the debtor probably cannot furnish, Professor McMahon
called suspensive appeal a "particularly hollow remedy." McMahon, supra note 8, at 658.
36. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2644 provides: "The plaintiff in an executory proceeding
may convert it into an ordinary proceeding by amending his petition so as to pray that
the defendant be cited and for judgment against him on the obligation secured by the
mortgage or privilege." The article further provides that "[t]he plaintiff in an ordinary
proceeding may not convert it into an executory proceeding." See also Richard v. Bird,
4 La. 305, 307-08 (1832).
37. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2771.
38. Id. art. 2772.
39. "The confession of judgment, having served its purpose in the executory pro-
ceeding, has become functus officio, and the mortgage must prove the indebtedness asserted
by the usual modes of proof." McMahon, supra note 8, at 571.
40. La. Civ. Code art. 1831 provides in pertinent part: "A party who demands
performance of an obligation must prove the existence of the obligation."
41. Id. art. 1994 provides: "An obligor is liable for the damages caused by his failure
to perform a conventional obligation. A failure to perform results from nonperformance,
defective performance or delay in performance."
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show that the property was sold after appraisal in accordance with law. 42
The debtor can defend by showing that the creditor has failed to make
his case or by rebutting an element of that case, such as the validity
of the appraisal. 43 The debtor may also assert that the obligation is
null, has been modified or has been extinguished. The debtor carries
the burden of proving nullity, modification, or extinction."
PRIOR JURISPRUDENCE
In addition to those listed above, the courts developed another
defense to a deficiency judgment following seizure and sale under ex-
ecutory process. Under the supreme court's decision in League Central,
a debtor could assert the existence of a defect in the executory pro-
ceedings as an affirmative defense to a creditor's suit for deficiency
judgment.
This defense originated in Tapp v. Guaranty Finance Co., 4 a 1963
decision of the first circuit court of appeal. The Tapp case involved an
action to annul a deficiency judgment. The plaintiff had given a prom-
issory note as part of the price of an automobile and had executed a
chattel mortgage on the car as security for that note. The seller trans-
ferred the note to the defendant finance company. The debtor defaulted
on the note, and the defendant obtained an order for executory process.
The car was seized and sold with appraisal, and the defendant proceded
against the plaintiff for the deficiency, which was granted. The debtor
met attempts to enforce that deficiency judgment with an action for
nullity, claiming that the executory proceeding was defective because the
note sued on was not in authentic form.
The first circuit agreed that the executory proceedings were null for
want of proper authentic evidence. The question became whether the
debtor could prevent a deficiency judgment because of a defect in the
executory proceedings. The first circuit held that the debtor could assert
the earlier defect against the action for a deficiency. The court reasoned
that if the order for executory process was null, it could not serve as
the basis for a legal appraisal and sale. Since the Deficiency Judgment
42. See supra notes 27-28.
43. If the sale is made without benefit of appraisal, then the creditor will be denied
a deficiency judgment. See supra notes 28 and 37. However, where there is substantial
compliance with the statutory appraisal requirements the court should not find that the
sale has been made without valid appraisal. See, e.g., G.M.A.C. v. Mergist, 520 So. 2d
1109 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1987), writ denied, 522 So. 2d 566 (1988).
44. La. Civ. Code art. 1831 provides in part: "A party who asserts that an obligation
is null, or that it has been modified or extinguished, must prove the facts or acts giving
rise to the nullity, modification, or extinction."
45. 158 So. 2d 228 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963), writ denied, 245 La. 641, 160 So. 2d
228 (1964).
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Act46 prohibits deficiency judgments except where the judicial sale occurs
after a legal appraisal, the court concluded, the deficiency judgment
against the debtor was void because it was based on a null order for
executory process.
Critics of the Tapp decision were concerned that allowing such
attacks on the validity of an executory proceeding would adversely effect
the stability of titles acquired through judicial sales. 47 This concern for
the stability of titles formed the basis for the fourth circuit's opinion
in White Motor Co. v. Piggy Bak Cartage Co.4 In that case, the
creditor had caused three trucks mortgaged by the defendant to be sold
under executory process. The creditor's petition for executory process
was defective because it did not contain authentic evidence authorizing
the execution of the chattel mortgages for the defendant corporation.
The debtor did not assert this defect to prevent the seizure and sale of
the trucks, but raised the defect for the first time as a defense against
the subsequent suit for deficiency judgment. The debtor's argument
followed the reasoning of Tapp: the lack of authentic evidence made
the order of seizure and sale null; a null order could not support a
legal appraisal, and hence there was none; and, because there was no
legal appraisal, the Deficiency Judgment Act barred the creditor's suit.
The fourth circuit holding rejected the debtor's argument that once
the property was adjudicated to an innocent third party, the mortgagor
was estopped from complaining that the order for executory process
was signed without sufficient authentic evidence. It did not matter, in
the view of this court, that the debtor did not assert the defect in an
attempt to annul the sale, but only as a defense to an action for
deficiency judgment brought by the seizing creditor.4 9 The court reasoned
that holding proceedings null because of minor formal irregularities
would inevitably have an adverse effect on titles obtained through judicial
sales. In short, the fourth circuit limited the Tapp rationale to cases in
which the property was not in the hands of an innocent third party.50
The Louisiana Supreme Court reconciled this apparent conflict in
League Central Credit Union v. Montgomery." After an automobile was
sold through executory process, the credit union sought and obtained
a deficiency judgment. The debtor appealed the deficiency judgment,
46. La. R.S. 13:4106-4108.2 (1968 & Supp. 1989).
47. Note, Civil Procedure-Annulment of Executory Proceedings After Sale, 24 La.
L. Rev. 894, 901 (1964) and McMahon, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts
for the 1963-1964 Term-Civil Procedure, 25 La. L. Rev. 433, 450 (1965).
48. 202 So. 2d 294 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 251 La. 390, 204 So. 2d 574
(1967).
49. Id. at 296.
50. Id. at 297.
51. 251 La. 971, 207 So. 2d 762 (1968).
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contending that the act of mortgage had been improperly acknowledged
and thus the executory proceeding was null. The debtor argued that the
defect in the executory proceeding precluded a deficiency judgment.
The fourth circuit avoided the issue because it found that no defect
appeared in the executory proceedings2 The supreme court found that
the acknowledgment of the act of mortgage was in fact defective and
hence was forced to resolve the conflict between the Tapp and White
Motor cases. The court, adopting the reasoning of Tapp, held that a
defect in the prior executory process constituted an affirmative defense
to a later action for deficiency judgment. 3
The court found that the Code of Civil Procedure provisions setting
out the authentic evidence required to institute executory process were
prohibitory laws. Under then article 12 of the Civil Code54 encroachments
on prohibitory laws are nullities.? Executory proceedings based on im-
proper authentic evidence are null. Further, the court reasoned, any
action based on the null executory proceedings is also null. Hence, a
deficiency judgment action could not be based on defective executory
proceedings .16
The identical line of reasoning, when put forth by the Tapp court,
had been criticized for its adverse effect on titles to property. The
League Central court responded to these criticisms by pointing out that
in an action for deficiency judgment, the seizure and sale are not
implicated. In such an action, the debtor is seeking not to annul the
executory proceedings, but to defeat a deficiency judgment. 7 To protect
the stability of property rights acquired by innocent third parties through
such sales, the court specified that in such instances the debtor could
not annul the executory process and regain the property. Rather, the
declaration of nullity only prevented a deficiency judgment based on
the null executory process.
THE FIRST GUARANTY OPINION
On the rehearing of the case, the Louisiana Supreme Court examined
only one issue 8 : Does the creditor's failure to submit authentic evidence5 9
52. League Central Credit Union v. Montgomery, 198 So. 2d 914 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1967).
53. League Central, 251 La. at 978, 207 So. 2d at 764.
54. La. Civ. Code art. 12 (1870).
55. Civil Code articles 11 and 12 (1870) have been incorporated into article 7. The
official comments to article 7 indicate that this revision was not intended to change the
law. See La. Civ. Code art. 7 comment (a).
56. See supra -note 28.
57. League Central, 251 La. at 980, 207 So. 2d at 765.
58. On original hearing the court had found that authentic evidence of a corporate
resolution authorizing the corporation to give a mortgage is an essential link of proof in
an executory proceeding. This finding is not questioned on rehearing.
59. See supra text accompanying note 12.
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in the executory proceeding constitute a defense to the creditor's sub-
sequent ordinary action for a deficiency judgment? This question had
been answered by League Central, but the court decided that a "careful
re-examination" 6 of League Central was called for.
The opinion began with a synopsis of League Central and its holding.
This introduction ended with a statement foreshadowing the demise of
the League Central rule:
League Central and its progeny have created an affirmative
defense to a deficiency judgment action which has nothing to
do with whether the property was sold after valid appraisal or
whether a just deficiency is due, but rather with whether the
mortgagee complied with every jot and title as to the form of
authentic evidence required in the executory proceeding.
6
'
Before beginning its re-examination of League Central the court
presented an overview of the law in the areas of executory proceedings,
annulment of judicial sales, and deficiency judgment. 62 The court con-
cluded its discussion of direct action to annul sale under executory
process by explaining that Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:4112 provides
that lack of authentic evidence or formal defects in the executory process
may not serve as grounds to annul a completed sheriff's sale of im-
movable property. 63 Although this section of the opinion purported only
to "describe the legal context in which [League Central] arises," 64 in a
footnote the court rejected the defendant's argument that the last sen-
tence of Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:4112-"[n]othing herein shall be
construed to affect legal defenses otherwise available to any person
againft whom a deficiency judgment is sought after public sale of
immovable property through executory proceedings" 65-incorporated the
60. First Guar. Bank v. Baton Rouge Petroleum Center, Inc., 529 So. 2d 834, 838
(La. 1988).
61. Id. at 839.
62. Much of the court's discussion of these areas of law was taken verbatim, but
without acknowledgment, from Justice Tate's original opinion in Reed v. Meaux, 292 So.
2d 557 (La. 1973). Justice Tate's opinion was reversed in a rehearing of the case.
63. First Guaranty, 529 So. 2d at 841 n.2.
64. Id. at 839.
65. La. R.S. 13:4112 (Supp. 1989) provides:
No action may be instituted to set aside or annul the judicial sale of immovable
property by executory process by reason of any objection to form or procedure
in the executory proceedings, or by reason of the lack of authentic evidence to
support the order and seizure, where the sheriff executing the foreclosure has
either filed the process verbal of the sale or filed the sale for recordation in
the conveyance records of the parish. Any party seeking to annul or set aside
a judicial sale of immovable property through executory proceedings filed for
record before the adoption of this Section must do so within six months of
1186 [Vol. 49
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rule of League Central into the statutory law. The court found that the
language in question expressed a legislative intent that the statute should
not alter any statutory or jurisprudential defenses available against a
deficiency judgment. Justice Dennis characterized the last sentence of
section 13:4112 as being "carefully worded so as to permit jurispru-
dentially created defenses to be overruled or modified by the courts and
to be affected by other statutes." 66
Having reviewed the statutory framework, the court began its assault
on League Central. The court identified two premises upon which the
League Central case rested:
(1) the requirement of proper authentic evidence in executory
proceedings is a prohibitory law; and whatever is done in con-
travention of a prohibitory law is void, though the nullity be
not formally directed; and (2) if improper authentic evidence
was filed so as to render the executory proceedings null, any
action based upon the executory proceedings is likewise null.67
Examining the first of these premises, the court found that the term
"prohibitory law," as used in the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870,68 means
"rules of public order." Since rules of public order serve to protect
the public interest, an individual may not renounce them. 69 The court
then explained that the Code of Civil Procedure provisions requiring
authentic evidence in executory proceedings are not prohibitory laws
within this meaning for they neither expressly nor impliedly prohibit the
debtor from renouncing them. Instead, the Code provides that the debtor
may assert the creditor's failure to comply with those provisions as a
defense to the executory proceeding through an action for injunction
or a suspensive appeal. In the court's view, the Code of Civil Procedure
provisions leave it within the debtor's discretion whether the defense of
improper procedure is raised. From this, the court concluded that a
defect that the debtor did not object to did not make the entire pro-
ceeding absolutely null. 70
With the first of League Central's premises decisively refuted, the
court then examined the second premise. This second premise-that if
the executory proceeding is null then any action based on the executory
proceeding is null-was seen to have two possible interpretations. The
September 12, 1975. Nothing herein shall be construed to affect legal defenses
otherwise available to any person against whom a deficiency judgment is sought
after the public sale of immovable property through executory proceedings.
66. First Guaranty, 529 So. 2d at 841 n.2.
67. Id. at 842.
68. See supra note 55.
69. See La. Civ. Code art. 7 comment (d).
70. First Guaranty, 529 So. 2d at 843.
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first interpretation was that the failure to submit proper authentic ev-
idence nullified the executory process and thereby nullified the subsequent
deficiency judgment. Based on its conclusion that the laws requiring
authentic evidence are not prohibitory laws, and that failure to comply
with them did not annul the executory process, the court found this
reasoning erroneous.
The court then turned to the second possible interpretation, that
any defense available to the debtor in the executory 1Rroceeding may be
raised in the action for deficiency judgment because the deficiency
judgment action "is based upon, a part of, or a continuation of the
executory proceeding. ' ' 71 The court rejected this reasoning as well. While
acknowledging that the deficiency judgment action is related to the
executory proceeding, the court pointed out that the deficiency judgment
action "is established by the legislated law as a separate and independent
proceeding [from executory process], different in concept and purpose,
involving different kinds of procedure, evidence, and defenses." '7 2 To
further illustrate that the deficiency judgment and executory process are
separate actions, the court enumerated the Code of Civil Procedure's
requirements for a deficiency judgment 7" and noted that "[t]he legislated
law does not require a creditor to prove that he presented flawless
authentic evidence in the executory proceeding in order to obtain a
deficiency judgment or grant the debtor a defense to a deficiency judg-
ment based upon the creditor's failure to do so." 74
Because it found that League Central was not in accord with Louis-
iana's positive law, the court characterized the affirmative defense created
by that case as an "anomaly," which "further indicates that the juris-
prudence has developed contrary to the legislative intent." 71 The anomaly
arose from the fact that a debtor who asserted his defenses to the fullest
extent allowed by the Code of Civil Procedure 6 was left in an inferior
position to the debtor who failed to raise the defenses until the action
for deficiency judgment. 77 If the debtor raised the procedural irregular-
ities in the executory proceeding, the procedure the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure seems to contemplate, the creditor could cure the defect and still
get a deficiency judgment. But if an indiligent or shrewd debtor waited
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See La. Code Civ. P. arts. 2771-72, discussed supra in text accompanying notes
37-38.
74. First Guaranty, 529 So. 2d at 843.
75. Id.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 31-35.
77. Where the debtor asserts a defense against the executory proceeding, the creditor
is authorized to convert the action into an ordinary proceeding through which he may
obtain a judgment for the full amount of the debt. See supra note 36.
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until the deficiency judgment action to raise the irregularity, the League
Central rule rewarded the debtor by abolishing the right to a deficiency.
In short, a debtor who waived his rights to stop the executory proceeding
was in a better position than one who diligently followed the procedure
set forth in the Code. Following the reasoning of a scholarly criticism
of the Tapp case, 78 the court said of this situation: "There does not
appear to be any reason in law or logic that the diligent debtor should
be penalized [as discussed above] for exercising the defenses in the
manner specifically provided by law, i.e., by appeal or injunction. 79
The opinion concluded its reexamination by rejecting an argument
that the Deficiency Judgment Act justified the League Central defense. s0
The court pointed out that the Deficiency Judgment Act was adopted
to prevent creditors from recovering windfalls by purchasing valuable
property from the sheriff at a small price and then pursuing the debtor
for a large "deficiency." 8 1 The appraisal provisions of the Act, said the
court, offered some protection to the debtor against this clause. Under
the Act, if the creditor denies the debtor the protection by selling without
proper appraisal, the creditor may not be granted a deficiency judgment
for any balance due on the debt. As a matter of public policy the debt
in such situations is seen as fully discharged. But this public policy is
not limitless. In the court's words:
Although this policy is broad and strong, there is nothing in
its history or expressions that indicates an intention to bar a
creditor who fully complies with appraisal requirements from
obtaining a deficiency judgment simply because of a lack of
authentic evidence in the executory proceeding.82
78. See Note, supra note 47, at 900-01.
79. First Guaranty, 529 So. 2d at 843.
80. The courts in both Tapp and League Central reasoned that the lack of authentic
evidence made the executory process invalid and that an invalid executory process could
not serve as the basis for a valid appraisal. By finding the appraisal invalid through this
reasoning the court could deny deficiency judgment by applying La. R. S. 13:4106 (1968).
In Note, Civil Procedure-Deficiency Judgment After Invalid Executory Process, 29 La.
L. Rev. 405, 407 (1969), the author stated:
[T]his reasoning seems to be more makeweight than the actual basis for the
decision [in Tapp]. The real basis seems to be that only the executory process
was invalid. However, by this artificial invalidation of the appraisement, the
court bolstered its decision because the legislation explicitly provides [in the
Deficiency Judgment Act] that a failure to appraise the property precludes
recovery of a deficiency judgment.
81. See McMahon, supra note 8, at 567 for a discussion of the abuses of waivers
of appraisal that led to the enactment of the Deficiency Judgment Act.
82. First Guaranty, 529 So. 2d at 844.
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ANALYSIS
Effects of the First Guaranty Decision
With its decision in First Guaranty, the Louisiana Supreme Court
overruled 20 years of jurisprudence that had required creditors to strictly
follow the proper procedure when foreclosing on a mortgage through
executory process or face the possible loss of the right to recover a
deficiency judgment. Although it had for all practical purposes enjoyed
the status of law for two decades, League Central was rejected as an
improper interpretation of the codal and statutory laws of Louisiana.
First Guaranty should not be seen to signal the demise of the strong
public policy of protecting debtors,83 but rather as a return to enforcing
that policy in the manner contemplated by the Code of Civil Procedure.
Executory process is indeed a harsh remedy that should not be afforded
a creditor who has not strictly complied with the formal requirements
imposed by law to protect the debtor. 4 League Central induced creditors
to exercise great care in executory proceedings so as to avoid being
denied a deficiency judgment because of some defect in the executory
process.85 Even without the judicially created rule of League Central,
however, the Code of Civil Procedure contains adequate incentives to
insure that creditors will not blithely disregard the requirements of law
when seeking executory process. The debtor can defeat executory process
instituted without the required showing of authentic evidence by asserting
that defect through a suspensive appeal, an injunction, or both. The
Code also subjects a creditor to liability for damages for wrongful seizure
and attorney's fees.16 Thus, even without the threat of losing the right
to a deficiency judgment, the risk of delay and higher costs should
suffice to prevent creditors from intentionally seeking executory process
without meeting the authentic evidence requirements of the Code of
Civil Procedure.
First Guaranty and the many other cases since 1968 involving the
lack of sufficient authentic evidence in support of a creditor's petition
for executory process indicate that even under League Central, creditors
occasionally failed to meet the Code's requirements. In such instances,
League Central not only provided the debtor with a defense to deficiency
83. See L'Enfant, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1973-1974
Term-Civil Procedure, 35 La. L. Rev. 442, 460 (1975); Tate, The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1968-1969 Term-Civil Procedure, 30 La. L. Rev. 286, 308
(1969); Note, supra note 80, at 408.
84. See Myrtle Grove Packing Co. v. Mones, 226 La. 287, 76 So. 2d 305 (1954) and
cases cited therein.
85. See Tate, supra note 83, at 307.
86. See supra note 32.
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judgment not contemplated by the Code of Civil Procedure, but it also
discouraged the debtor from asserting the defenses to the executory
proceeding in the manner provided in the Code. League Central en-
couraged defendants to allow their property to be sold under defective
executory process. If the debtor sought an injunction or appeal as
provided by the Code, the creditor would either convert the action into
an ordinary proceeding seeking a judgment for the full amount of the
debt or cure the defect, petition the court a second time for executory
process, and recover the full amount of the debt through judicial sale
and a subsequent deficiency judgment action. By not objecting to the
defect, the debtor reserved a defense to the deficiency judgment action
and thus limited the creditor's recovery to the net proceeds of the judicial
sale, often an amount much less than the outstanding debt. That League
Central encouraged debtors to knowingly disregard defects in the ex-
ecutory process against them and to purposefully fail to object to such
defects in the manner provided by the Code shows that the rule of that
case was not in accord with the intent of the Code.
The court's holding will have a dramatic effect on those debtors
who have allowed their property to be sold under an executory process
that was not supported by the required authentic evidence, but who
have not yet faced an action for deficiency judgment. Like the Baton
Rouge Petroleum Center these debtors, in reliance on League Central,
may have chosen not to assert the defect in the executory proceedings
in order to preserve an affirmative defense to any subsequent action
for deficiency judgment. Under League Central this was a prudent course
of action. The affirmative defense to deficiency judgment would have
enabled the debtor to limit his liability on the obligation to the proceeds
of the sale of the collateral.
What was an artful strategy has, because of the court's decision in
First Guaranty, become a waiver of the right to defeat executory process.
Under First Guaranty, the existence of this defect in the completed
executory process will be of no consequence in the deficiency judgment
action. Despite the fact that the debtors may have relied on a juris-
prudential rule repeated over twenty years, they will be unable to assert
their claims in the deficiency judgment action. Thus, First Guaranty
operates after the fact to change the effect of these debtors' failure to
raise the lack of authentic evidence through appeal or injunction.
First Guaranty will also effect a change in the strategy of defendants
when executory proceedings that are not supported by the required
authentic evidence are brought against them. In cases in which the
property would have been sold without objection under League Central,
debtors will now seek to stop the sale of mortgaged property under
executory process. Debtors will no longer elect to withhold their objec-
tions to the lack of authentic evidence but will instead employ the
suspensive appeal and injunction provided by the Code to prevent the
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seizure and sale of their property under the defective executory process.
The amount of security that must be posted in order to take a
suspensive appeal 7 makes it fairly likely that most of the actions to
stop executory proceedings will come in the form of applications for
an injunction to arrest the seizure and sale of the property." Possibly
anticipating this, the legislature amended the Code of Civil Procedure
provisions governing such injunctions. This amendment changes Code
of Civil Procedure article 2752(A) to provide that "a temporary re-
straining order shall not issue to arrest the seizure and sale of immovable
property." 9 By eliminating the availability of temporary restraining or-
ders in these cases, the legislature has acted to preserve the expeditious
nature of executory process by preventing the delay of the judicial sale
in instances where the debtor's attack on the executory process is without
merit.
The debtor will still be able to prevent the sale of his property
before the trial of his action for injunction, but he must do so through
the more onerous preliminary injunction. Unlike a temporary restraining
order, a preliminary injunction will issue only if notice and an oppor-
tunity had for a hearing has been given to the adverse party.90 The
application for preliminary injunction will be denied if the applicant
fails to make at least a prima facia showing that he will prevail at the
trial on the merits of the case for injunction. This standard insures that
the debtor's interest in the mortgaged property will be protected until
the action for injunction can be tried on its merits so long as the
debtor's claim for injunction is not groundless. On the other hand, it
protects the integrity of the process by allowing the creditor who has
fully complied with the strict requirements governing executory process
to recover the debt owed to him without needless delay.
More uncertain is the effect, if any, that First Guaranty will have
on the constitutionality of Louisiana's executory process provisions.
These provisions were held constitutional in Buckner v. Carmac.9 In
that case, the Louisiana Supreme Court found that Louisiana's executory
process did not violate due process in light of the following factors:
87. See supra text accompanying note 35.
88. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2753 enumerates several situations in which a debtor seeking
an injunction to arrest the seizure and sale of property under executory process is not
required to post any security. One of the cases in which no security is required is where
the injunction is sought on grounds that "[t]he order directing the issuance of the writ
of seizure and sale was rendered without sufficient authentic evidence having been submitted
to the court, or the evidence submitted was not actually authentic." La. Code Civ. P.
art. 2753.
89. 1988 La. Acts No. 812.
90. See La. Code Civ. P. arts. 3602-3603.
91. 272 So. 2d 326 (1973), writ refused, 417 U.S. 901, 94 S. Ct. 2594 (1974).
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that the debtor has executed a confession of judgment waiving the right
to adversarial hearing; that a writ of seizure must be served on the
debtor; that the debtor has a right to a suspensive appeal from the
order of seizure and sale; and, that the debtor may enjoin the judicial
sale, in many instances without the posting of a bond. 92 It has been
suggested that since Buckner was handed down only five years after
League Central, the court's affirming of executory process might have
been influenced by the fact that any discrepancy in the executory pro-
ceeding would, under League Central, allow the debtor to avoid any
subsequent deficiency judgment.93 This argument is not without merit,
but it seems that since Buckner based the constitutionality of executory
process on the debtor protections provided by the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure and not the affirmative defense created by League Central, the
First Guaranty decision, which embraces the Code's debtor protections
and encourages debtors to assert them, should not bring Buckner's
finding that executory process is constitutional into question.
Recommendation
First Guaranty does highlight one problem with executory process:
The debtor protections found in the Code of Civil Procedure are of no
use to the debtor who is not aware of them. It is reasonable to assume
that many consumer debtors are not aware of their right to challenge
an executory proceeding through injunction or suspensive appeal. Because
they are faced with seizure of their property, it is also reasonable to
assume that some of these debtors will find it difficult to obtain legal
assistance when served with the demand for payment or the notice of
seizure. Many of these debtors likely resign themselves to losing the
mortgaged property without realizing that they might also be found
personally liable for any balance remaining on the debt after the sheriff's
sale.
Executory process is an inherently harsh remedy as it stands. The
proceedings need not be made more trying by subjecting the debtor to
personal liability when he expects to lose only the mortgaged property,
and is not expecting to face the additional personal liability. This is
not to suggest that the creditor should be denied the obligation owed
him, but the debtor should know that he faces personal liability and
the possible seizure of other property if the proceeds of the judicial sale
are insufficient to extinguish the mortgage debt. Such knowledge would
allow the debtor to make an informed decision about the possibility of
legal aid. Moreover, the debtor will be unable to police the actions of
92. Id. at 329-32.
93. Rubin, Developments in the Law, 1987-1988-Security Devices, 49 La. L. Rev.
495, 499 (1988).
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the creditor if he does not know that he has the power to stop the
sale. Hence, although an injunction or appeal against the executory
process will not absolutely defeat the creditor's right to recover, 94 the
debtor should at least be made aware that these protections are available.
Conveying the information regarding the possibility of deficiency
judgment and the right of injunction and appeal would be relatively
easy. The Code of Civil Procedure provides that the sheriff shall serve
the defendant with written notice upon seizure of the defendant's prop-
erty. 95 Unlike the demand for payment, this notice of seizure may not
be waived. An amendment could be added to this article requiring that
the notice of seizure contain a statement notifying the debtor in layman's
terms that the creditor may obtain a deficiency judgment and that the
debtor has the right to stop the sale of the mortgaged property if the
creditor does not strictly adhere to the requirements of law. Such an
amendment would involve little more than the printing of new forms
by Louisiana's sixty-four sheriff's offices, and it would not impair the
creditor's right to recover the full amount of the debt owed him. It
would, however, alleviate some of the inherent harshness of executory
process by at least allowing the debtor to know what to expect and
informing him of his possible protections. By increasing the effectiveness
of the debtor protections found in the Code of Civil Procedure this
amendment would also help to shield the executory process provisions
against a constitutional attack arising out of the rejection of League
Central.
CONCLUSION
The public policy of protecting debtors should not be served by
denying creditors a deficiency judgment to recover a debt lawfully owed
to them solely on procedural grounds. The law should protect the debtor
by insuring that the harsh remedy of executory process is not granted
unless the creditor has proven his right to that action by complying
with the letter of the law. League Central encouraged debtors to allow
defective executory proceedings to become final; First Guaranty will help
insure that defective executory proceedings do not become final by
encouraging the debtor to assert any defects in the proceeding as a
defense in the manner contemplated in the Code.
The decision in First Guaranty is, at least in part, a product of the
existing economic climate of the state. Although the proper forum for
addressing social and economic conditions is the legislature, the Louisiana
Supreme Court cannot be expected to operate in a vacuum. A civilian
94. See supra note 36.
95. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2721 comment (b).
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court should not engage in judicial lawmaking, but its decisions must
to some degree be responsive to changes in social and economic con-
ditions, especially where that response entails turning away from a
jurisprudential rule, even one in which the legislature acquiesced for
twenty years.
If the jurisprudential rule better served the public interest, then the
legislature should respond to the court's rejection of that rule by enacting
it into the positive law. That the legislature did not enact the rule of
League Central into the positive law in the session following the supreme
court's decision in First Guaranty is some indication that the interpre-
tation of the law in First Guaranty is in accord with the legislative will.
First Guaranty is a timely decision and logical interpretation of the
Code of Civil Procedure articles. This interpretation relieves lenders of
the threat of loss created by the jurisprudential rule of League Central
while providing the debtor in default with every right contemplated by
the Code. League Central had extended the laudable public policy of
protecting debtors faced with the harsh remedy of executory process by
creating a defense to deficiency judgment not provided by the Code of
Civil Procedure. First Guaranty acknowledges that the lenders of Louis-
iana can no longer afford that extension. 96
Jay B. Mitehell
96. In 1987 a record 184 F.D.I.C. insured banks failed. Sixty-three percent of the
failures and F.D.I.C. assistance deals were in the southwest region (including Louisiana).
The F.D.I.C. attributes the problems of banks in this region to non-performing loans in
the areas of energy, real estate, and agriculture. Bank failure records were also set in
1985 and 1986, and the F.D.I.C. foresees up to 200 bank failures in 1988. See Rehm &
McTague, 1987 Closings Fall Just Below Grim Forecast, Shuttering of 184 Banks Sets
Another F.D.I.C. Record, American Banker, Jan. 5, 1988, p. 1.
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